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ARTICLES
PRIVATE EQUITY’S THREE LESSONS FOR
AGENCY THEORY
William W. Bratton *
Agency theory posits that separation of ownership and control opens up
a governance deficit. 1 The shareholder principals, it says, have a collective
action problem that leaves them without an economic incentive to monitor
their manager agents. 2 The theory, in its original form, held out the hostile
takeover as a cure. 3 Unfortunately for the theory, the hostile takeover went
on to evolve as a transaction mode too costly to serve as a universal
governance corrective. 4
Still looking to make up the deficit, agency theorists turned to holders
of large blocks of stock. 5 But this inquiry led to an intractable tradeoff.
Separation of ownership and control holds out the benefit of liquidity and
easy exit through the trading market even as it leaves the managershareholder incentive problem unsolved. 6 Meanwhile, the blockholder
alternative reduces liquidity even as it ameliorates the manager-shareholder
incentive problem. 7 As a result, blockholding poses its own incentive
problem. A rational blockholder is unlikely to give up the benefits of
liquidity in order to extract gains from improved governance if required to
share those gains with the rest of a free-riding shareholder population. 8 A
different sort of governance dysfunction follows—a rational blockholder
will seek compensation for its governance contribution through self-dealing
transactions, insider trading, or some other unshared mode of return. 9
The blockholder inquiry having led to an impasse, agency theorists look
for other means to circumvent the tradeoffs. This search returns again and
again to the sleeping giant of corporate governance, the institutional
investor community. 10 The giant, although fitfully wakeful, has not risen
from its bed.
*
1.
2.
3.

Peter P. Weidenbruch, Jr., Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Jean Tirole, Corporate Governance, 69 ECONOMETRICA 1, 1 (2001).
See generally id.
See Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership,
Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 233–36 (2008).
4. Id.
5. See Frank Heflin & Kenneth W. Shaw, Blockholder Ownership and Market Liquidity, 35 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 621 (2000).
6. See generally id. at 622.
7. Id.
8. See Joseph A. McCahery & Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Corporate Governance Crises and
Related Party Transactions: A Post-Parmalat Agenda, AMSTERDAM CENTER FOR CORPORATE
FINANCE, available at http://www.accf.nl/uploads/corp%20gov%20crises%20and%20related
%20party%20transactions.pdf.
9. See Heflin & Shaw, supra note 5, at 622.
10. Tirole, supra note 1, at 2.
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Private equity buyouts occupy an anomalous but intriguing place in this
unsettled governance picture. Buyouts carry blockholding out to its logical
conclusion, completely removing the target firm from the equity trading
market and, in so doing, making the ultimate liquidity sacrifice. 11 A given
buyout is conducted by a limited partnership (the “buyout fund”) that is
organized and promoted by a private equity firm (the “buyout firm”). 12 The
buyout firm serves as the buyout fund’s general partner, selecting the going
private target, effecting the buyout, and undertaking the role of target firm
monitor. 13 The buyout fund, which draws its risk capital from institutional
investors who take the fund’s limited partnership shares, is the purchasing
entity. 14 The fund takes the majority equity stake in the target, with the
target’s managers as the only minority shareholders. 15 The buyout fund’s
limited partnership agreement, along with the transaction’s other operative
contracts, allocates the risks and returns between the buyout firm and the
outside institutional investors. 16
The buyout target emerges from the control transfer with a governance
structure that approaches the agency ideal. 17 Its incumbent managers get
high-powered incentives as minority shareholders. 18 Even better, the
arrangements effected by the buyout fund’s limited partnership agreement
solve the blockholder incentive problem. The buyout firm, as general
partner, has a high-powered incentive to monitor, and all matters respecting
allocation of risk and returns between the monitor and the outside equity
investors are determined ex ante, eliminating free rider and aggregation
problems. 19
Buyouts accordingly have a mesmerizing effect on some agency
theorists, who propose ownership by buyout funds as a strong form solution
to the problem of separated ownership and control. 20 But liquidity remains
a problem that diminishes the buyout’s plausibility as a universal
governance solution. Investors readily sink capital into publicly traded
equities on an indefinite durational basis, but only if given assurance of
trading liquidity. 21 Private equity contracts finesse the problem by limiting
11. Harry DeAngelo et al., Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27
J.L. & ECON. 367, 374 (1984).
12. Id. at 367.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 370.
15. Id. at 367.
16. Id.
17. DeAngelo et al., supra note 11, at 367.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept.–Oct.
1989), revised 1997, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146149 [hereinafter Eclipse of the
Public Corporation]; see also Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–236.
21. See Garry D. Bruton et al., Corporate Restructuring and Performance: An Agency
Perspective on the Complete Buyout Cycle, 55 J. BUS. RES. 709, 710 (2002).

2008]

Private Equity's Three Lessons for Agency Theory

3

the buyout fund’s duration, putting the buyout firm on a tight, ten-year
leash, with liquidation and cash distribution at the end of the term. 22 Public
markets loom large once the liquidation phase is reached. The most
profitable subsets of buyout targets are liquidated through initial public
offerings prior to the ten-year terms’ expiration. 23 Many other targets are
purchased by publicly traded companies. Buyouts accordingly do not trump
trading markets; they coexist with them in a symbiotic relationship. 24 Even
as buyouts pose a structural alternative to separated ownership and control,
their business model exploits and depends on market liquidity.
Thus does the prevailing view about buyouts draw on the framework of
agency theory and looks for lessons respecting the theory’s unsolved
problem, the separation of ownership and control. This Article, in contrast,
changes the inquiry’s direction. Where agency theory focuses on the
buyout’s implications for separated ownership and control, this Article
considers the buyout’s implications for agency theory. It points out, in its
three parts, what the buyout tells us about agency.
Part I addresses agency theory’s three-way association among control
transfers, governance discipline, and hostile takeovers, suggesting that this
triptych needs to be unbundled and reconsidered. Given the recent move to
buyouts, we no longer need assume that hostility is the acquisition mode
best-suited to post merger disciplinary governance. Today’s disciplinary
mergers are friendly. Part II considers agency theory’s account of buyout
motivations. The theory posits a transactional margin at which agency cost
reduction determines control outcomes. 25 On first inspection, private equity
buyouts neatly fit this picture. But a deeper examination shows that buyouts
are driven by the economics of leverage, with agency cost reduction taking
only a secondary motivational role. Part III looks at financial returns,
showing that even as buyouts ameliorate the agency costs of separated
ownership and control, buyout structures implicate their own agency costs
in the form of fees paid to buyout firms. Studies show that buyout firms
take so much of the transactional gain that the institutions investing in
buyout funds would be better off investing in market indices. 26 There
results question the line of agency theory that looks to institutional investors
as agency cost reducing monitors. There also result questions respecting
buyouts’ incentive compatibility, questions raising doubts as to whether
buyout governance structures hold out a template for improving corporate
governance generally, even as a matter of agency theory.

22. Douglas J. Cumming & Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, Venture-Capital Exits in Canada and the
United States, 53 UNIV. OF TORONTO L. J. 101, 160 (2008).
23. See Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 710.
24. Id.
25. See Tirole, supra note 1, at 2.
26. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. BOOM AND BUST: IMPLICATIONS FOR AGENCY THEORY
Private equity buyouts and hostile takeovers pursue different
transactional routes to the common goal of governance discipline, the
former cooperative and friendly and the latter uncooperative and unfriendly.
This Part compares their records of occurrence across the past three decades
to show the buyout’s emergence as the more salient mode of disciplinary
control transfer. The comparison suggests that agency theory needs to relax
its categorical association between hostile transactions and disciplinary
results.
A. BUYOUT CYCLES
Private equity buyouts occur in cycles. 27 Between 1979 and 2007, two
cycles of buyouts occurred: the first peaked in the 1980s, and the second
began in the late 1990s, peaked in 2006 (or, more precisely, in the first half
of 2007) and then began to decline. 28 Between the two booms was a
spectacular bust from 1990 to 1997. 29 Another bust appears to be in its early
stage—preliminary figures for 2008 show the dollar volume of buyouts at
less than one-third of the 2007 volume. 30
Figure I: Buyouts as a Percentage of
Total Public Acquisitions, 1979–2007 31

27. See Figure I.
28. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in

the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2001).
29. Id. at 122–123.
30. See Amerbereen Choudhury, Cerebus, Carlyle Profit From Sales in LBO Drought, Aug.
13, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=home&sid=aJGREa0y
4Qvg.
31. Figure I presents Mergerstat’s annual data on the number of “going private” transactions as
a percentage of total public company acquisitions. Mergerstat defines “going private” as an
acquisition of a publicly-traded company by a private investment group or individual where the
buyer is not an operating business. The data thus picks up classic 1980s leveraged buyouts and
their evolutionary successors, contemporary private equity transactions.
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Figure I, which is based on a number of transactions, somewhat
overstates the salience of buyouts in the wider merger market. A
comparison based on transaction value rather than numbers of transactions
would show a smaller percentage of total acquisitions for going private
transactions, because buyouts tend to involve smaller firms. 32 The dollar
amounts remain impressive, however. During the recent buyout boom,
buyouts went from an aggregate $154 billion in 1999 to $907 billion in
2006, with a 29 percent cumulative annual growth rate. 33 Private equity’s
value-based share of merger activity increased in tandem, showing a
cumulative annual growth rate of 27 percent from 1999 to 2006. 34 Dollar
amounts of individual buyout deals rose as the cycle peaked: between 2005
and 2007, the average buyout tripled in size to weigh in at $1.3 billion. 35
B. THE FIRST BOOM AND THE AGENCY ACCOUNT
A widely-accepted agency story accompanied the buyout’s first rise
during the 1980s. The story followed from Michael Jensen’s account of
suboptimal management performance and correction through capital market
intervention. 36 For Jensen, the outbreak of manager-shareholder conflict
stemmed from the managers’ habit of reinvesting “free cash flow,” defined
as cash flows from operations in excess of those necessary to fund positive
return investments. 37 The money, said Jensen, was being put into
unproductive plant and value-reducing acquisitions when it should have
been paid out to the shareholders. 38 Hostile takeovers and friendly
leveraged buyouts were said to address the problem. 39 Both paid
shareholders a premium over market, in effect making up for past
deprivations of cash flow. 40 They also led to divestment of subpar
acquisitions and to redirection of investment policy in productive
directions. 41 Leverage also played a part in this disciplinary redirection of
corporate focus. 42 A higher level of corporate borrowing raised the rate of
return on equity, even as it lowered the corporation’s overall cost of capital
due to tax savings. 43 More debt also encouraged management discipline on
32. A comparison of Mergerstat’s annual record of total public company acquisitions and its
annual record of going private transactions establishes this, showing that private equity dollar
volume approximated its share of total acquisitions only at the peak of the recent cycle.
33. See Blackstone Group L.P., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 115 (Mar. 22, 2007).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs, Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (Papers & Proceedings 1986).
37. Id. at 324.
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Jensen, supra note 36, at 328.
43. Id.
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a going-concern basis. 44 Given the mandatory nature of the debt payments,
they deterred ongoing waste of cash, thus returning the capital to the
markets. 45
Jensen took the governance and capital structure of buyouts as an
agency solution to separated ownership and control, suggesting that the
“LBO Association,” with its combination of high leverage, control in the
hands of market intermediaries, and high powered incentives for managers,
amounted to a robust one-size-fits-all mode of governance. 46 But the
buyout’s disappearance in the early 1990s put an end to the claim of an
early, levered disappearance of separated ownership and control. At no time
since then has high leverage been seen as suited to a permanent place in
corporate capital structures or as the sine qua non of shareholder value
maximization. The rewards only intermittently outweigh the risks.
The buyout retained its prestige in agency theory even as new deals
disappeared. This reputational persistence stemmed partly from the
attribution of the early 1990s shift away from leverage to regulatory
constraints. 47 The continued vitality of the shareholder value norm and its
dispersion into management suites also played a role. The 1980s came to be
seen as a period of shock therapy that redirected management priorities in a
more productive direction, revitalizing managers normally slow to adapt to
changed conditions. 48 Newly enabled capital markets imposed responsive
strategies as management learned its lesson. In the 1990s, managers,
incentivized by stock option compensation, voluntarily downsized their
operations and unbundled conglomerates. 49 According to agency theorists,
the shareholder value approach became dominant because the capital
markets had a comparative advantage in initiating structural reforms
necessitated by deregulation and technological change. 50 Buyouts were a
means to that end.
The buyout’s good reputation also found support in empirical studies.
These looked at the 1980s’ deals from various points of view and confirmed
the story of governance improvement. 51 The increased leverage and
incentive realignment was shown positively to affect operating performance

44. Id.
45. Id. at 323–24.
46. See generally Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 20 (modeling the LBO

association and asserting its superiority as a governance structure).
47. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831e(d) (2000) (providing that thrift
institutions may only invest in investment grade debt securities); 1991 Conn. Acts 91-262 §§ 3(c),
4(c) (limiting junk bonds to 10% of insurance company portfolios). This point had some validity
as far as concerning risky lending by regulated institutions such as savings banks and insurance
companies.
48. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 28, at 122.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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and productivity. 52 There was also evidence of increased sales and cash
flows, decreased expenditures, improved margins and reduced capital
requirements. 53
C. THE SECOND BOOM AND THE DISCIPLINARY MERGER
When buyouts reappeared in significant volume around the turn of the
twenty-first century, questions about their place in agency theory returned.
Some again asserted that the reappearance heralded the eclipse of separated
ownership and control. 54 Others looked for explanations grounded in
changes in the risk management environment. 55 Still others, looking at
buyouts’ historical track record, saw a cyclical phenomenon driven by
secular conditions that lacked overarching theoretical significance. 56
Consider now a fourth suggestion: Private equity buyouts are the real world
instantiation of the disciplinary merger predicted by agency theory. As
such, they highlight some infirmities in the theory.
Agency theory makes the hostile takeover the lynchpin of an efficient,
market-driven governance framework. 57 This follows in part from an
economic theory of mergers, which assumes the strong version of the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH): a firm’s stock price accurately reflects
its intrinsic value. 58 Given this assumption, a bidding firm will pay a
premium over the market price of a target’s stock only if the proposed
combination creates new value sufficient to cover the price paid and to
assure a profit. 59 A merger or takeover can create the necessary value in two
cases. The first is the synergistic merger: a transaction where valuable
synergies arise from combining the operations of the bidder and target
firms, such as cost savings or technological advances. 60 The second case is
the disciplinary merger: a transaction motivated by the target management’s
52. Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 710.
53. See Erkki Nikoskelainen & Mike Wright, The Impact of Corporate Governance

Mechanisms on Value Increase in Leveraged Buyouts, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 511, 512 (2007)
(surveying the empirical studies); see also Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 711 (same).
54. See Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 251–62.
55. See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 25–26,
28–34
(Aug.
10,
2008)
(unpublished
Working
Paper,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1215188) (suggesting that the proliferation of derivative devices opens up
new means of spreading risk and so makes public ownership less important, and that private
ownership at the same time facilitates better risk management of complex derivative positions).
56. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity (Eur. Corp.
Governance
Inst.,
Law
Working
Paper
No.
082,
2007),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982114.
57. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–36.
58. See Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics (Princeton U.
CEPS, Working Paper No. 91, 2001).
59. See NICHOLAS DIMSDALE & MARTHA PREVEZER, CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 24 (1994).
60. See Kenneth J. Martin & John J. McConnell, Corporate Performance, Corporate
Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991).
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failure to maximize value and the bidder’s desire to create value by
correcting the suboptimal conduct. 61
This theory of mergers offers two descriptions of conditions that make
a firm a candidate for a disciplinary merger, one open-ended and the other
more particular. In the general description, incumbent management is either
incapable of running the firm efficiently or firm governance has otherwise
broken down. 62 A target might be hobbled by excessive perquisite
consumption, excessive compensation, overpayment for supplies, labor, or
raw materials, or self enriching or self-aggrandizing projects, or a
combination of the foregoing. 63 The disciplinary acquirer creates value by
cleaning house and replacing management. 64 The more specific description
sets out three diagnoses of management failure along with three
accompanying cures. Under the first, target management makes ill-advised
diversifying acquisitions, so that the successful acquirer divests the
unrelated lines of business. 65 Under the second, the target invests in excess
productive capacity so the acquirer downsizes or otherwise constrains
investment policy. 66 Under the third, the target’s capital structure is
underleveraged so the acquirer steps up borrowing. 67 Note that while all
three acquirer correctives impose “discipline,” broadly conceived, all three
also implicate differences of opinion respecting the target firm’s business
plan rather than a diagnosis of poor governance practice, narrowly
conceived. 68 Significantly, the agency story that accompanied the 1980s’
boom posed the buyout as the cure to all three ailments. 69
Agency theory underscores and elaborates on this theory of mergers
when it posits that agents tend to slack off and behave opportunistically. 70 If
a firm’s internal governance mechanisms fail to check such a tendency, the
firm’s stock price will decline, attracting a hostile bid. 71 The hostile bidder
thus performs a backstop governance role. 72 Expanding this theory, we can
posit an ideal world in which all management groups are subject to hostile
offers all the time by other managers who value the corporate assets more

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 823

(5th ed. 1996).
64. See generally DIMSDALE & PREVEZER, supra note 59, at 25.
65. See Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 28, at 122.
66. Id. at 127–129.
67. Id.
68. See Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Hostile Takeovers and the Correction of Managerial
Failure, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 166 (1996).
69. Id.
70. Gilson & Whitehead, supra note 3, at 233–236.
71. Id.
72. See R. Sinha, The Role of Hostile Takeovers in Corporate Governance, 14 APPLIED FIN.
ECON. 1291 (2004).
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highly. 73 In the ideal world, assets constantly move to the highest valuing
user, maximizing shareholder value and economic welfare. 74
The agency account goes on to link mergers’ transactional postures to
their economic motivations. Synergistic mergers are deemed likely to be
friendly, negotiated transactions, while disciplinary mergers are likely to
follow from hostile tender offers. 75 Because friendly mergers presuppose
the agreement and participation of incumbent management, they do not
necessarily implicate disciplinary motives or effects. 76 Indeed, pursuit of
synergies from asset combinations sometimes improves the lot of all of the
firm’s stakeholders. 77 Hostiles, in contrast, are thought more singlemindedly to serve the target shareholder interests and to threaten target
stakeholder interests. 78
Thus does the hostile takeover emerge, playing a central role in the
agency account. The record of incidence, however, triggers a question about
the account’s accuracy. Hostile takeovers have represented only a small
portion of acquisitions, and their incidence has diminished over time. 79
Figure II 80 draws on the Mergerstat database to compare the total number of
public company acquisitions completed during the period of 1974–2007 to
numbers of formally registered tender offers and of registered tender offers
formally opposed by target management. The merger waves of the 1980s
and 1990s show up clearly, punctuated by a fall off in overall activity
between 1989 and 1994. For present purposes, the most significant
difference lies in the waning of hostility. Although absolute numbers of
tender offers recovered in the mid-1990s, they did so as a much diminished
proportion of overall merger activity. Moreover, the hostile tender offer did
not reappear on a proportionate basis within the tender offer subset.
Although it still exists, it has almost disappeared, relatively speaking.
Meanwhile, as Figure I shows, buyouts returned.

73. See Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21
(1988).
74. See G. William Schwert, Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN.
2599 (2000).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. See infra Figure II.
80. See MERGERSTAT REVIEW (2007), available at https://www.mergerstat.com/
bookstore/samp_mr.pdf.
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Figure II: Total Number of Hostile Takeovers Relative to
Total Public Company Acquisitions, 2004-2007 81

Today, the private equity buyout stands as the sector of the mergers and
acquisitions market most likely to present post closing incidences of
governance discipline sought by agency theory. The buyout firm acts as an
aggressive blockholder, closely monitoring performance and imposing
performance targets. 82 Even as the private equity business model includes
and depends on the participation of management incumbents and
incentivizes them with a share of the equity, it also includes and depends on
an active removal threat. 83 Leverage enhances the threat by interpolating the
possibility of downside disaster, and magnifying the financial payoff for
success. 84 Accordingly, discipline is built into the governance structure
even as pre-closing hostility is avoided. 85
The comparison has important implications for the theory of the
disciplinary merger. The surge and sudden decline of hostile takeovers
presents a causation question. Most ascribe the change to antitakeover
regulation. 86 If they are right, there still arises an inference of a disciplinary
deficit and concomitant opportunity cost. Others, however, ascribe the
eclipse to a range of factors. In one such view, hostility is a negotiating
position holding out high costs quite apart from antitakeover barriers. 87 If
that is the case, then the disappearance of hostility does not imply
significant opportunity costs. This account dovetails with both views. Even
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 56, at 9.
Id.
Id.
These are friendly combinations.
See, e.g., Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 5 (1995).
87. See Schwert, supra note 74, at 2599.
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if regulation, rather than value fundamentals, choked off the hostile tender
offer, buyouts have picked up much of the slack. 88 While hostility has
largely disappeared from the control market, discipline has not. 89 And,
because discipline holds out value, it can be interpolated on a friendly
basis. 90 Accordingly, agency theory and the related ideology of corporate
legal theory need updating.
The recent emergence of activist hedge funds underscores such a need.
In this still small sector, the sleeping institutional shareholder giant rises
from its bed. 91 Here a new class of corporate raiders mounts hostile
challenges to managers and business plans at publicly traded firms
worldwide. 92 These are impatient shareholders, who look for value and
want it realized in the near or intermediate term. 93 Their strategy is to tell
managers how to realize that value and to challenge publicly those who
resist their advice, using the proxy contest as a threat. 94 The strategy has
proved successful. 95 Significantly, the strategy, while hostile, does not
primarily aim for transfers of control. 96 Instead, the players act out a game
of threat and resistance in which victory lies in either the insurgent’s entry
to the boardroom on a minority basis or the target’s diffusion of the threat
with a governance concession. The game leads to cooperative outcomes in a
significant number of cases. 97 One once again notes the hostile tender
offer’s absence and apparent evolutionary adaptation by the capital markets.
Summing up, activist hedge fund interventions show that hostility
survives with a disciplinary governance impact, but does so without a tie to
control transfers. Disciplinary control transfers also survive, but only based
on cooperative negotiations. Meanwhile, the market-driven control transfers
on which agency theory has hung its hat for three decades are disappearing.
It is time for a ground up reassessment of the theory’s operative
assumptions.
II. DISCIPLINE, LEVERAGE, AND VALUE
Part I took a look at buyout volume, noted the transactions’ disciplinary
aspect, and then associated discipline with transactional friendliness,
casting doubt on agency theory’s association between hostile initiation and
88. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63 J. FIN. 1729, 1732 (2008).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See generally id.
93. Id.
94. Brav et al., supra note 88, at 1745.
95. See, e.g., id. at 1739–45.
96. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 1422–27
(2007).
97. Id. at 1405–09.
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post-closing discipline. This Part turns to agency theory’s account of buyout
motivations. Agency theory ascribes discipline, agency cost reduction and
productivity improvement joint and primary roles as transactional
motivators and depicts the buyout firm in a unique role as a value creator. 98
This Part asks how well buyout transactions sustain these theoretical
aspirations, comparing governance improvement and leveraged gain as
transactional motivations. It shows they both play a role in buyouts, but
suggests leverage is better accorded the primary role in accounting for the
recent boom.
As discussed earlier, the conventional wisdom of the 1980s was that
buyouts prevent managers from reinvesting free cash flows. 99 One hears
this free cash flow story less and less as time passes. Today, some doubt
that the free cash flow account accurately described the profiles of 1980s
buyout targets. If the story was true, the takeovers and buyouts of the era
would have concentrated on firms that were overinvested relative to other
firms in their industries. At least one study by Henri Servaes, has found no
evidence of overinvestment compared with industry benchmarks, no
relation between abnormal returns of the target firms and measures of
overinvestment or industry investment, and no evidence of overinvestment
in respect of a subclass of hostile targets. 100 There were two exceptions:
larger firms and firms in the oil and gas industry. 101 When considering the
core productivity claim made for 1980s buyouts, this is a devastating result.
Subsequent studies provide confirmation, showing that expected reductions
of free cash flows do not primarily motivate these deals. 102
Cost cutting and situation-specific management improvement are the
remaining possible disciplinary motivators for today’s transactions. Such
98. See generally Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation,
9 YALE J. REG. 119 (1992).
99. Jensen supra note 36, at 323.
100. Servaes’s study looks for overinvestment in a class of 700 takeover and buyout targets
during the period of 1972–87. See Henri Servaes, Do Takeover Targets Overinvest?, 7 REV. FIN.
STUD. 253, 254 (1994).
101. Id. at 254. See also Boysn Jovanovic & Peter L. Rousseau, The Q-Theory of Mergers 1
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8740, Jan. 2002) (finding that the free cash
flow account explains only a small number of mergers and asserting that a typical firm may waste
cash on mergers but not on internal investment); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon R. Hanka, The
Management of Corporate Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence 520 (Jan. 13, 1997)
(unpublished Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501) (studying the effect of
antitakeover provisions and finding that protection does not impact firm size or profitability).
102. See Douglas Cumming et al., Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts and Governance, 13 J.
CORP. FIN. 439, 441–42 (2007) (showing that targets are selected based on stock market valuation,
undervalued companies being preferred, and the projected tax savings stemming from leveraged
capital structure).
This does not go to say that today’s managers always return free cash flow to their
shareholders. They often horde cash, but they put it into short term liquid investments rather than
safe businesses. See Bratton, supra note 96, at 1415–18. Such a cash account could indeed
motivate a buyout offer, but as source of an immediate post-closing dividend rather than as a
source of a disciplinary improvement.
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factors are intuitively attractive, and there is empirical support for the
proposition that buyouts involve both. 103 Even so, their explanatory traction
has limits. For example, assume that Buyout Firm X is looking at two firms,
A and B, as potential buyout candidates. Firm A has an excellent
management team and low leverage, but is a value stock—its steady but
dowdy industry does not enjoy investor favor. Firm B, also with low
leverage, is an underperformer in a more glamorous industry due to a
substandard management team and business plan. As between the two,
which is the better buyout candidate? Agency theory, read together with the
EMH, signals Firm B over Firm A. If the managers are good and the stock
price is right, Firm A holds out no value. Meanwhile, Firm B holds out a
disciplinary arbitrage profit. In the buyout world, in contrast, Firm A is the
quintessential target. Private equity firms look for value, which exists in
cases of pronounced inequality between market capitalization and
fundamental value. 104 At the same time, because the control transfer comes
on friendly terms and the managers take equity stakes, manifest problems
with the top team make for value-reducing frictions. Finally, value
enhancement does not necessarily imply basic changes in the business plan.
The leverage can do the heavy lifting in generating positive returns.
To see the importance of leverage, assume a buyout target with $1
billion enterprise value and $700 million of debt in its post-buyout capital
structure. If the company is sold in five years in a $1.3 billion public
offering, the annual growth of the value of the firm is 6 percent over the
initial $1 billion. Any number of factors can contribute to that 6 percent
value enhancement. Certainly, firm-specific management improvements
will help. Even so, a $1.3 billion IPO yield could be due entirely to growth
in the economy, a stock market more inclined to favor the firm’s industry,
or the tax advantages attending the buyout debt. Whatever the source of the
gain, the value of the equity investment will have doubled—as a result of
the leverage, it will show a 15 percent annual rate of return rather than a 6
percent return. Such high returns imply high risks. 105 If the company gets
into difficulty and has an enterprise value of $850 million at the end of the
five year period and has not paid down any debt, that 15 percent decline
implies a 50 percent loss on the private equity investment. 106
Either way, the buyout firm has a high powered incentive to extract
performance improvements during the five year period. For example, on the
upside scenario, if the target manages to cut costs sufficiently to release
103. See Cumming et al., supra note 102, at 444–50 (summarizing the literature and discussing
the empirical difficulties); Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 716–19 (showing performance
improvements during the buyout period in a sample of buyout firms that later conducted reverse
LBOs).
104. See Cumming et al., supra note 102, at 441 (confirming that buyout firms look for
undervalued targets).
105. See Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 33, at 115.
106. See id.
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enough operating cash flow to pay down $300 million of borrowing, the
equity investment triples and the annual internal rate of return is 25 percent.
The same performance improvement also reverses the downside result from
a loss to a modest gain.
The question of whether the recent buyout surge was agency-driven or
financially-driven remains. The answer is that, while both elements
contributed, few observers would put primary weight on the agency side. 107
Readily available credit at low interest rates fills the bill better. In mid2007, risk premium of junk bonds over U.S. Treasuries reached a historic
low of 2.63 percent, compared to a 20-year average of 5.42 percent. 108 It is
true that buyouts returned from their 1990s trough with less leverage in
their capital structures than previously, but leverage remained salient.
Assuming a target with an enterprise value of $1 billion, a typical
transaction in the recent wave would entail an equity investment of $300
million and $700 million of debt. 109 This debt-to-equity goal of 30–70 is
still much more conservative than the 1980s’ rule of thumb of 20–80 or 10–
90. 110 On the other hand, capital structures of restructured companies
became riskier during the boom’s late phase. 111 The average ratio of cash
flow to interest cost was 3.4 in deals closing in 2004, 2.4 in 2006 deals and
1.7 in 2007 deals.
At the same time, lenders eased the terms of the debt, with some deals
having terms resembling the deal terms of late 1980s. “Pay in kind toggle”
bonds became common, giving the borrower an option to defer paying
interest until maturity, with the deferred sums paying a higher rate. Such
“PIK” terms were emblematic of the late 1980s leveraged capital structures
that got into trouble after the economy faltered in 1989. 112 In addition,
beginning in 2005, more and more private equity loans were “covenant

107. For an empirical study of buyouts conducted in the 1990s that confirms the salience of
financial and tax over performance motivations, see Shourun Guo, et al., Do Buyouts (Still)
Create Value?
2–4 (June 3, 2008) (unpublished Working Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108808).
108. For empirical confirmation of this point, see Ulf Axelson, et al., Leverage and Pricing in
Buyouts: An Empirical Analysis 4–5 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished Working Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027127) (showing that levels of debt in LBOs are unrelated to firm
characteristics but highly sensitive to prevailing interest rates in the leveraged loan market).
At the same time, merger premiums in recent years generally have been lower than in the
1980s. Where the earlier rule of thumb was 30 to 50 percent premium, in recent years 20 percent
deals have been common.
109. Blackstone Group L.P., supra note 33, at 115.
110. See Guo, supra note 107, at 6 (showing that 1990s buyouts entailed lower leverage and
lower up front premiums).
111. See id. at 4–6.
112. Helen Power, Credit crisis one year on: Risky debt notes could be a losing game, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Sept. 22, 2008, at 5, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/
newsbysector/banksandfinance/2794340/Credit-crisis-one-year-on-Risky-debt-notes-could-be-alosing-game.html.
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lite,” omitting debt covenants and ratio tests. 113 In 2007, “covenant lite”
loan volume reached $96.6 billion, compared with $23.6 billion recorded
for the whole of 2006. 114 The current credit crisis has halted such extremely
risky behavior.
The case for leverage as deal motivator also can be made negatively. As
already noted, the buyout boom peaked in mid-2007, with activity falling
precipitously thereafter. 115 After mid-2007, $144 billion of pending buyouts
were abandoned or delayed. 116 Credit contraction is the reason for such a
drop. 117 The easy credit that fueled the boom depended on exit by
securitization as well as low rates. Buyout lenders sold their loans into
securitized packages, with the repaid principal available to fund more and
bigger buyouts. The credit crunch has choked off the securitization pipeline,
leaving the investment banks holding an unexpected $200 billion of buyout
paper and looking for someone to buy it. 118 Meanwhile, the value of buyout
debt in circulation has dropped, precipitously in some cases, making sale of
the paper in the pipeline more difficult still. 119 The “covenant lite” posture
of recent deals has aggravated the price declines. 120 The banks have taken
write-downs. 121 Market participants are already drawing parallels to the
junk bond market collapse that began in 1989. 122
To the extent the parallels to the 1989 collapse hold, a challenge will be
posed for agency theory. Back then, agency theorists blamed the credit
collapse on new regulation. 123 Today they have no such excuse 124 and will
have to account for the boom-bust cycle. Their theory ill-equips them to do
113. See W.Y. CAMPBELL & CO., SECOND QUARTER 2007 MIDDLE-MARKET TRANSACTION
UPDATE 3–4 available at www.wycampbell.com/media/marketupdates/q2-07wycmarket
update.pdf.
114. See INVESCO, MARKET COMMENTATOR: LEVERAGED LOAN MARKET REVIEW 4 (2007),
available
at
http://www.institutional.invesco.com/portal/file/invescoinst/pdf/LeveragedLoan
Overview.pdf.
115. See Bloomberg News, Borrowing Costs Slowing Buyouts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2007, at 2.
116. Emily Thornton, Done Deals in Distress: Debt Issued for Recent Buyouts is Fast Losing
Value, BUS. WK., Feb. 11, 2008, at 30. For critical analysis of the documentation at issue in these
failed transactions, see Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1148178.
117. See Thornton, supra note 116, at 30; see also Davidoff, supra note 116, at 178.
118. Thornton, supra note 116, at 31.
119. Liz Rappaport & Peter Lattman, ‘Anyone for Some Used Corporate Debt?’ Why
Leveraged Loans that Financed Buyouts are Causing Bottleneck, WALL. ST. J. Feb. 6, 2008, at
C1.
120. Thornton, supra note 116, at 30–31.
121. Carrick Mollenkamp, et al., Leveraged Loans Inflict More Pain on Banks Globally, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 19, 2008, at C2.
122. Thornton, supra note 116, at 30.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 47–8.
124. It is, however, noted that Michael Jensen warns of unspecified new regulation in a posted
PowerPoint slideshow. See Michael C. Jensen, The Economic Case for Private Equity (and Some
Concerns) – PDF of Key Note Slides (Harvard NOM, Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963530.
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so. Agency theorists, very much in the Modigliani-Miller tradition, tend to
assume that finance is irrelevant and look only to a firm’s assets for
valuation purposes. 125 Absent a specific tie between a particular capital
structure and the incentives of the asset manager, 126 agency tends to assume
that the mode of finance is irrelevant. Leverage figures into the agency
buyout story only as a motivator in the context of the post-closing
relationship between target managers and their buyout firm overseers; 127 it
is not held to motivate deals independently.
But the real world is more complicated. Conditions conducive to
buyouts coalesce only when targets can be outfitted with highly levered
capital structures. Accordingly, buyouts thrive only when markets hold out
ready credit on attractive terms. Because the credit markets only do this
intermittently, the sector has cyclical character. And, even as the buyout
firm has high-powered incentives to improve the target firm’s performance,
it is not clear that performance improvement by itself motivates buyouts.
Leveraged gain motivates independently.
III. INVESTMENT RETURNS
Leverage, then, is the buyout’s sine qua non. Even so, a completed
buyout creates a high powered incentive for performance improvement and
agency cost reduction. An empirical question arises respecting the quantum
of improvement seen in practice. This Part takes up the question, turning
from ex ante incentives to value generated ex post. We will see that value is
indeed generated, but that all of it is allocated to the buyout firm. As a
result, questions are raised for buyout structures and their incentive
alignments.
A. BUYOUT RETURNS
Buyout data is hard to obtain. Once the target is taken private, its results
disappear from the radar screen of public trading, the usual source of data
for financial analysis. During a buyout fund’s ten-year life, one must rely
on the sponsor’s self-serving reports. The most reliable data is generated at
the end of the line when the buyout fund is terminated and its participants
get their final distributions. Only then are there time-sensitive figures on
amounts invested and returns thereon. Therefore, analyses of buyout returns
appear on a time lag—recent studies cover buyout funds raised during the
mid-1990s and earlier. It will be some time before there are reports on funds
raised during the recent boom.
125. Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).
126. The suboptimal reinvestment of free cash flow story told in the 1980s affected such a tie.
See Jensen, supra note 36, at 323.
127. Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 20, at 11–13.
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Meanwhile, analyses of past fund returns suggest that future returns
may be low. Financial economists have been working from a database
collected from voluntary reports by private equity firms and private equity
investors. Sample bias is admitted, but if it is safe to assume that the worst
performers are less likely to report voluntarily, any skew in the data lies on
the side of over-reporting good results. 128
The leading published study from the database comes from Kaplan and
Schoar, who analyze the returns of 169 buyout funds that were close to
fully liquidated during the period 1980 to 2001. 129 Their central analytical
tool is the “public market equivalent” (PME). This is a ratio of the present
value of all cash distributions by the fund (including undistributed assets
taken at book value) over the present values of all of the fund’s drawdowns
using the year by year realized return of the S&P 500 as the discount rate. 130
A PME less than one means that the fund investor would have been better
off putting the capital in a market index. The figures below are net fees
retained by the fund. 131
PME, 1980–2001

Equal weighted

Size weighted

Median

0.80

0.83

Average

0.97

0.93

Internal rates of return (IRR) were as follows: 132
IRR, 1980–2001

Equal weighted

Size weighted

Median

0.13

0.15

Average

0.19

0.19

The picture is disappointing. The IRRs approximate those of the
market. As for the PMEs, neither the equal-weighted nor size-weighted
results beat the market. Kaplan and Schoar break the results into time
periods to show that both PMEs and IRRs were better for funds raised in

128. Steven N. Kaplan & Annette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence,
and Capital Flows, J. FIN. 1791, 1794 (2005).
129. To be included in the sample, the fund must have distributed no returns for at least six
quarters. Kaplan and Schoar assume that any undistributed residuals values on a fund’s books are
worth their book amount. Id. at 1794–98. It is noted that this assumption favors the funds.
130. Id. at 1797.
131. Id. at 1798.
132. Id.
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the early 1980s and poorer for funds raised in the early 1990s. 133 More
particularly, out of the funds raised between 1987 and 1994, the PME
exceeds one for only those raised in 1990. 134 Because buyout funds are
under-diversified and illiquid, 135 they would need to return PMEs somewhat
greater than one to be investments with returns more attractive than those of
the market.
Phalippou and Gottschalg update and extend these results, covering
funds liquidated through 2003 and adding a sample comprised of additional
liquidated funds. 136 They claim to cover 57 percent of the private equity
universe in terms of size. 137 Grouping venture capital funds with buyout
funds, they obtain an average PME of 1.01, 138 which compares with Kaplan
and Schoar’s combined aggregate PME of 1.05 for venture capital and
buyout funds. 139 This poor result is magnified when Phalippou and
Gottschalg adjust Kaplan and Schoar’s assumptions so as to write down any
unliquidated assets to zero. 140 This causes the aggregate venture and buyout
PME to decline to 0.88. Finally, Phalippou and Gottschalg extend their
analysis, separate the buyout funds from the venture funds, and substitute
for the S&P 500 a discount rate derived from a risk adjusted cost of capital
for industry comparables. 141 This reduces the buyout PME to 0.75. 142

133. Id.
134. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1801–02.
135. See Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds 7 (Sept. 8,

2008) (unpublished Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=996334).
136. Ludovic Phalippou & Oliver Gottschalg, The Performance of Private Equity Funds 7 (EFA
Moscow
Meetings,
2005)
(unpublished
Working
Paper,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=473221).
137. Id. See also OLIVER GOTTSCHALG, STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ECONOMIC
AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY DEPARTMENT, PRIVATE EQUITY AND LEVERAGED BUY-OUTS 12–15
(2007),
available
at
http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
gottschalg-eu-parliament-study.pdf (showing an average 3 percent above market per annum
performance gross of fees and a negative 3 percent below market per annum performance net of
fees).
138. See GOTTSCHALG, supra note 137, at 12–15. See also Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note
136, at 11.
139. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1798 tbl. 2.
140. GOTTSCHALG, supra note 137; see also Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 3.
141. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 19.
142. Id. at 19–20. Christian Diller & Christoph Kaserer, What Drives Private Equity Returns? –
Fund Inflows, Skilled GPs, and/or Risk? (CEFS Working Paper No. 2004-2, 2004), available at
httpbu://ssrn.com/abstract=590124, calculates PME for 200 European buyout funds to get similar
results – the average is 0.90 and the median 0.89. For a set of contrary results, see Alexander
Ljungqvist & Matthew Richardson, The Cash Flow, Return and Risk Characteristics of Private
Equity
(NYU
Finance
Working
Paper
No.
03-001,
2003),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=369600. They get an IRR for buyouts of 21.83 which compares favorably
to the S&P 500’s 14.1. On the other hand, their sample dates from the early 1980s, the period that
shows the most favorable results in Kaplan and Schoar’s larger sample. For a set of mixed results,
see Matthias M. Ick, Performance Measurement and Appraisal of Private Equity Investments
Relative to Public Equity Markets (May 2005) (unpublished Working Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=871931).
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None of this falsifies the general point that buyouts mean monitoring,
and monitoring means productivity gains. Significantly, the PME results
discussed above are net of the buyout firm’s fees. 143 From an efficiency
point of view, the net does not matter because it follows from an internal
distributional agreement. What matters is the gross—the total return to the
fund and its outside investors. The database, which depends on reporting by
investment institutions with limited partnership stakes in the buyout funds,
does not directly yield a gross. But Phalippou and Gottschalg, making some
assumptions based on buyout fund fee practices, have extrapolated a gross
PME of 1.12 for the aggregated venture capital and buyout funds. 144 From
an efficiency point of view, the most relevant figure is 0.11, the
distributional portion of that 1.12 that goes to the buyout funds.
The question remains as to how impressive a PME of 1.12 is. The
figure aggregates results from the database’s venture capital and buyout
funds. As venture returns tend to be higher, the gross PME for buyout funds
is presumably somewhat lower than 1.12. Moreover, even on a gross basis,
some of the return over market compensates for illiquidity. Even more
importantly, some of the return also compensates for the risk attached to the
target firms’ levered capital structures. Note also that the 1.12 figure covers
twenty-three years of fund liquidations stretching back to 1980. It thus
incorporates the first boom and the period’s levels of debt in the 85 to 90
percent range. Given these extreme capital structures, even a modest
increase in the value of the firm meant a substantial gain for the equity held
by the buyout fund. 145 Unfortunately, the data does not tell us just how
much of the positive PME stems from productivity gains. Nevertheless, the
inference still arises that it is not much.
B. MODES OF EXIT
These overall buyout returns may seem surprising in relation to studies
of reverse LBOs. In the standard depiction of a buyout, the transaction goes
forward with a view to a subsequent public offering, termed a reverse LBO
(RLBO). The RLBO returns the target equity to liquidity and enables the
buyout fund to make cash distributions to its limited partners. 146 The buyout
fund accordingly has every incentive to engage an RLBO as soon as
possible—one study finds that the median time in which a target stays

143. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 14–17; see also Kaplan & Schoar, supra note
128, at 1799.
144. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 4.
145. Jerry X. Cao & Josh Lerner, The Performance of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 4 (Oct. 15,
2006) (unpublished Working Paper, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=937801).
146. See Bruton et al., supra note 21, at 711.
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private is only three years. 147 RLBO firms have been analyzed extensively
and have good track records. 148
The wider implication is that public trading market opportunities
motivate buyouts, with a big payoff occurring as a result of the public to
private to public round trip. And such is the case, but with a catch: the big
payoff round trip occurs only in a minority of cases. Kaplan, working with a
sample of 183 large buyouts completed between 1979 and 1986, found that
by August 1990, 62 percent of the targets remained privately owned, 24
percent were owned by other public companies, and only 14 percent were
independent public companies. 149 Cao and Lerner, with a sample of RLBOs
from 1981 to 2003, have shown that the average annual percentage of new
LBOs to RLBOs is only 13 percent. 150 The going private movement thus
nets out on the private side over time, with round trips being the exception.
Phalippou and Gottschalg report a similar figure respecting mode of exit in
their sample: only 11 percent of the targets in the liquidated funds were the
subject of an RLBO. 151 How then do the buyout firms liquidate their
investments?
Negotiated sales to publicly traded companies provide a second exit
route, accounting for 24 percent of the targets in Kaplan’s sample. 152 If we
now add the RLBOs in Kaplan’s sample to the negotiated sales, we will
have accounted for only 38 percent of the targets. Similarly, Phalippou and
Gottschalg, with their bigger database covering a longer period, add (1)
asset and stock sales to publicly traded companies to (2) RLBO exits to
account for 31 percent of the targets. 153 It again follows that going private
means staying private in the majority of cases.

147. See id.
148. Cao & Lerner, supra note 145, shows performance superior to peers on both market and

accounting bases for a sample of 526 RLBOs during the period 1981 to 2003. See also Chris J.
Muscarella & Michael R. Vetsuypens, Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of
Reverse LBOs, 45 J. FIN. 1389 (1990) (studying 72 RLBOs in the period 1983–87 and showing
substantial increases in profitability in comparison to the firm’s pre-LBO results); Francois
Degeorge & Richard Zeckhauser, The Reverse LBO Decision and Firm Performance: Theory and
Evidence, 48 J. FIN. 1323 (1993) (studying 62 RLBOs in the period 1983–87 and showing their
accounting performance exceeds peer group performance prior to going public and then
deteriorates after the public offering with no evidence of post RLBO underperformance in the
stock market); Shehzad Mian & James Rosenfeld, Takeover Activity and the Long-run
Performance of Reverse Leverage Buyouts, 22 FIN MGT. 46 (1993) (showing slight
outperformance of stock market peers with a 1980s sample); Robert W. Holthausen & David F.
Larcker, The Financial Performance of Reverse Leverage Buyouts, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1996)
(studying 90 RLBOs in the period 1983–88 and showing no evidence of poor performance based
on accounting or stock price).
149. Steven N. Kaplan, The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts 29 J. FIN. ECON. 297 (1991).
150. Cao & Lerner, supra note 145, at 7.
151. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at tbl 3.
152. Kaplan, supra note 149, at 287.
153. Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at tbl 3.
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It is difficult to determine what happens to these still-private targets in
light of the fact that each fund is liquidated after ten years. 154 The study
results are thin, and the resulting picture murky. A sample of 321 exits in
the United Kingdom between 1995 and 2004 yields the following: on the
public side, 16 percent exited through RLBO and 29 percent exited through
trade sale (for a total of 45 percent); and on the private side, 38 percent
exited through receivership and 17 percent exited through secondary buyout
(for a total of 55 percent). 155 In other words, roughly two-thirds of the stillprivate targets ended up in financial distress, with the rest going out as
“secondary buyouts”: refinancings in which a second buyout firm takes out
the original buyout firm. 156 Buyout firms, then, pass off their junk targets to
one another. Third and even fourth time transfers have occurred in the
UK. 157 There are also partial liquidations, in which pieces of targets are
sold, often to another buyout fund. 158 Alternatively, the target increases its
borrowing or does a sale and leaseback of an asset and then makes a
dividend of the proceeds. 159 The less hospitable the IPO market, the more
likely the resort to these expedients.
Buyout exit, then, is a tricky, sticky business. Big payoffs come from
RLBOs and negotiated sales to operating companies, even as most targets
are disposed of in the low-return back room. As such, the sector’s
disappointing aggregate returns become less surprising.
C. MONEY CHASING DEALS
Studies of buyout returns that fully cover the sector’s first boom and
bust teach us some structural points about buyout cycles. Funds floated
early in the cycle do well. 160 As good results come in and the cycle moves
up the curve, the established players float new funds. 161 Successful buyout
firms add a new fund every three to five years. 162 Since the fee structures of
buyout funds remain relatively stable over time, a buyout firm that wishes
to maximize returns on its invested human and reputational capital will seek
to float a bigger fund. 163 New players also enter and float their own funds.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 2.
Nikoskelainen & Wright, supra note 53, at 513.
Id. at 514.
Cumming et al., supra note 102, at 456.
Id.
Id.
Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1792.
Id.
See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135. Note that the institutions offered the limited
partnership interest in the new funds accordingly must make their appraisals based only on the
previous fund’s interim results.
163. Id.
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But these late entrants are less likely to form follow-up funds, implying
lower levels of success. 164
The cyclical flow of cash into the sector correlates positively with target
valuations—as more money comes in, buyout funds pay more to acquire
targets. 165 Therefore, two inferences can be drawn. First, increases in target
values could be attracting the inflows into buyout funds, with money
following opportunity. Second, assuming a limited number of good targets,
increased inflows have the demand side effect of increasing the bids, with
the added money chasing deals. Studies support the latter inference,
showing that fund returns are negatively correlated with capital inflows. 166
If buyout returns to outside investors do not beat the market, on
average, and buyout cycles have perverse effects on valuations as they
approach their peaks, why do investment institutions clamor to participate
in new buyout funds as the cycle rises? Some argue that participation in the
sector has a portfolio effect and thus makes sense for well-diversified
institutions. 167 There also is at least one value-based explanation: buyout
returns tend to persist. A buyout firm that does well with a given fund in a
given industry is likely to repeat the result with its next fund. 168 This
distinguishes the sector from mutual funds, where success (famously) does
not tend to be replicated over time. 169 The persistence phenomenon implies
that some buyout firms are better than others, both in selecting and in
monitoring their targets. The sector has winners, and an institution invested
in a winner will benefit from above market returns.
Therefore, a minority of institutional investors likely do well with
buyouts, given the aggregate results. 170 Overconfidence is a standard
behavioral explanation for this sort of investment pattern—although only
one-quarter of investors will make abnormally positive returns, the capital
still pours in because 100 percent of investors believe themselves able to
pick the winners. 171 Business practices in the sector encourage such
164. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1791–93, 1816–19.
165. Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Money Chasing Deals? The Impact of Fund Inflows on

Private Equity Valuations, 55 J. FIN ECON. 281 (2000) (analyzing venture capital only).
166. Id.; Ljungqvist & Richardson, supra note 142, at 16. For a confirming industry study, see
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP & IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL, THE ADVANTAGE OF PERSISTENCE:
HOW THE BEST PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS “BEAT THE FADE”, available at
http://www.bcg.com/impact_expertise/publications/files/Private_Equity_Feb_2008.pdf.
167. See Do PE buyouts create value?, ECON. TIMES, Opinion, Aug. 24, 2007, available at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Do_PE_buyouts_create_value/articleshow/2305470.cms.
168. Kalpan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1792.
169. Id. at 1791–93. For a critical follow on finding that accounts for the higher returns at
experienced funds in terms of higher risk, see Joost Driessen, Tse-Chun Lin & Ludovic Phalippou,
A New Method to Estimate Risk and Return of Non-Traded Assets from Aggregate Cash Flows:
The Case of Private Equity Funds (June 2008) (unpublished Working Paper, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=965917).
170. Kaplan & Schoar, supra note 128, at 1791–93.
171. Ludovic Phalippou, Caveats When Venturing into the Buyout World, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=999910.
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delusions. Buyout firms and their industry associations issue selective and
skewed reports of historical results. 172 At the same time, it appears that
institutional investors bring to bear unsophisticated analytical yardsticks.
They use a payback model, looking to double their money across the tenyear buyout fund term. 173 In so doing, they ignore the cautionary advice of
elementary finance textbooks. Finally, selective incentives could be
motivating some of these institutions—maybe they seek service
relationships with the buyout firm and maybe their salary structures reward
their managers for the buyout fund’s interim results. 174
Fundraising by buyout firms was 37 times greater in 1998 than it was in
1985, and by 2006 was more than 100 times greater than in 1985,
suggesting the end may be near. 175 If money chases deals into this sector
and returns from funds raised near a cyclical peak tend to come in on the
low end of the scale, the future could be bleak.
D. FEES
If we accept Kaplan and Schoar’s buyout PME of 0.93 and concede that
the implicit result, gross of fees, is greater than one, the implication is that
the buyout firm takes all the gain it creates. Financial economists do not
find this result surprising, having already concluded as a theoretical
proposition that, in equilibrium, fund managers take all the rents. 176 Still,
further inquiry into the private equity fee structure is warranted. If, as
agency theory suggests, buyout governance structures approach the ideal in
part because an arm’s length contract distributes the rents, the distributional
particulars hold out extraordinary interest. Here at last we see capitalism
allocate risk and return in respect of large operating companies in a highincentive context free of regulatory distortions.
Private equity firms take fees on a number of bases. Most of their yield
is asset (rather than profit) based. 177 Historically, buyout firms took asset
fees of two percent of the capital committed to the buyout funds per fund
year. 178 Assuming a ten-year duration and actual investment of all capital
committed by the funds' institutional limited partners, an archetypical
buyout firm took twenty cents on the dollar off the top, actually investing
only eighty cents on the dollar. 179 But the practice has evolved so as to scale
back the two percent asset fee. Some funds reduce the annual two percent
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 7, 13–14.
Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 23–24.
Phalippou, supra note 171, at 4.
Cao & Lerner, supra note 145, at 4.
Richard C. Green & Jonathan B. Berk, Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational
Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9275, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=338881.
177. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 8–9.
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by 25 basis points per year starting in the sixth year; other funds leave the
two percent in place but shift to invested (as opposed to committed) capital
beginning in the sixth year; and other funds combine both reductions,
shifting to invested capital on a declining percentage basis in the sixth
year. 180 As a result of all this, the buyout firm’s current median off-the-top
draw of committed capital decreases to 12 percent. 181
Private equity firms also charge carried interest. 182 This is 20 percent of
profits, with 83 percent of the funds measuring profits against committed
(as opposed to invested) capital. 183 In addition, in 93 percent of the funds,
the buyout firm must surmount a hurdle before drawing down the carry. 184
For example, the investors must have received 8 percent on their committed
capital before the buyout firm may draw down, with the buyout firm taking
all of the next profit tranche until the carry is fully paid. There also are claw
backs for cases where later distributions prove insufficient to support the
full carry basis. 185 Metrick and Yasuda usefully describe this compensation
device as a fractional (20 percent) call option on the proceeds of
investment, with the strike price equal to the carry basis. 186
Finally, the buyout fund imposes charges on the target company. 187 A
transaction fee is charged upon both the sale and purchase of a target. 188 In
between, the target pays an annual monitoring fee based on its EBITDA. 189
The range in practice is one to five percent with smaller targets paying the
higher rate. 190 Both of these fee streams are shared between the buyout
firms and the outside investors. 191
The yield to a buyout firm on a given target will vary depending on the
particular contract terms. Metrick and Yasuda construct a simulation that
yields the buyout firm a median of $19.36 for every $100 invested by the
limited partners. 192 The breakdown is as follows—the asset fee yields
$11.78 (61 percent), the carry yields $5.35 (28 percent) and the fixed fees
yield $ 2.11 (11 percent). 193 In other words, the package’s high incentive
component accounts for only 28 percent of the buyout fund’s returns.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135, at 10.
Id.
Id. at 9–12.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–18.
Id.
See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135, at 16–18. EBITDA is earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation, and amortization.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 30.
193. Id. at 31–34. See also Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra note 136, at 17 (showing that
compensation comes from mainly large management fees and not the carry).
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E. SUMMARY
The lure of asset fees on committed capital assures us that buyout firms
will remain incented to raise capital and find targets. Once they do, the
carry will keep them incentivized to monitor their targets. Whether
institutional investors will continue to view the sector with favor, given the
track record of below-market returns, presents more of a question. Much
will depend on the results of funds presently in existence. If the past is a
guide to the future, the results will not be good. Superior performance will
be there only for a small number of astute institutions.
This unsatisfactory picture holds out a lesson for agency theory. Recall
that agency theory, as it grapples to solve the problem of separated
ownership and control in publicly-held firms, turns again and again to the
institutional investor community to look for some way to energize it into a
productive governance role. Here, after a look at the one sector agency
theory praises for incentive compatibility, it becomes hard to envision what
such a productive governance role might be. All institutions have been able
to do in thirty years in the buyout sector is bargain for modification in the
governing limited partnership agreements’ distributional terms. 194 Although
the terms have improved, they are still insufficient to allow the institutions
to escape the trap of below-market results. Actors such as these do not
come forth as plausible candidates to solve collective action problems and
create value.
Other lessons for agency theory lie in the financial structure that places
the buyout firm in the position of incentivized monitor. Recall that agency
theory also looks at blockholding shareholders as potential active
principals, but that the analysis runs into incentive problems. 195 So let us
now consider the buyout as a form of blockholding. The buyout fund takes
the blockholder position, but the motivating governance incentives do not,
strictly speaking, lie in the fund as blockholder entity. They instead lie in
the buyout firm acting as the general partner of the blockholding limited
partnership. Accordingly, the equity interest can be viewed in the target
through the buyout firm’s lens. How patient is this equity stake? The fund’s
ten year duration gives the arrangement a patient appearance. But
appearances can deceive. Given the bonus held out by carried interest, the
buyout firm has every incentive to shorten the duration of the fund’s
ownership. The fact that target firms held for the full ten years tend to be
losers 196 attests to this incentive’s real world effects. At the same time, the
limited partnership arrangement does solve the blockholder incentive
194. See Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135, at 31–34; see also Phalippou & Gottschalg, supra
note 136, at 17.
195. See Heflin & Shaw, supra note 5, at 621.
196. This follows from the results of RLBO studies, which show a duration of 3.8 years for
RLBO firms. See Cao & Lerner, supra note 145, at 10. When the public markets are receptive, the
buyout firm liquidates its winners quickly.
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problem. But, it does so by assuring that the party doing the actual
monitoring (1) is not the blockholder itself, (2) is not required to make a
significant equity capital investment ex ante, 197 and (3) is compensated on
an assured, priority basis through the combination of an asset-based charge
to the blockholder’s outside investors and a cut of the target’s annual cash
flow. The performance improvement incentive, in turn, is structured as an
option, which means that the holder takes a profit share on the upside but
suffers no loss on the downside. 198 Thus, while the buyout firm has a strong
incentive to make improvements to the target, loss aversion does not figure
directly into the mix.
Now to the bottom-line question of whether this arrangement holds out
lessons for operating companies burdened with agency costs. The analytical
exercise of collapsing the limited partnership (and its general and limited
partners) into the target firm to see what the unitary entity looks like helps
provide an answer. From this point of view, the buyout firm’s participation
resembles a majority voting preferred stock with a high fixed dividend and
an added pro rata participation. Only an operating company desperate for
capital would issue stock on such terms. In any event, the analogy fails on a
key point: the buyout firm has not necessarily contributed significant capital
and so may not risk significant capital loss. We accordingly might look for
an analogy elsewhere, comparing the buyout firm to an outside CEO, who
brings only reputational capital to the table. This analogy also fails on a key
point—unlike the CEO, the buyout firm owes no duty of loyalty. In any
event, this deal does not make business sense either. Today’s properly
incentivized CEO is not supposed to receive a fixed salary equal to eight
percent of the equity value of the firm. Nor would we expect a stock option
plan to divert to the CEO twenty percent of the gain on the stock, at least on
a rule of thumb basis.
In the end, the buyout super monitor bears no familial relationship
whatsoever to a long-term equityholder, block or otherwise.
IV. CONCLUSION
The private equity buyout overcomes the problems of separated
ownership and control by combining a debt-heavy, risky capital structure
with a transfer of control to a temporary super-monitor who makes no
significant capital contribution but takes all of the monitoring gain. High
powered incentives result. The structure appears to work within its own
limited durational framework, subject to a question concerning the
distribution of gain between the super-monitor and the outside equity
197. Private equity firms contribute only a small fraction of the limited partnership equity,
typically one percent. See GEORGE W. FENN, ET AL., FED. RESERVE THE ECONOMICS OF THE
PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 28 (1995) available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/
1990-99/ss168.pdf.
198. Metrick & Yasuda, supra note 135, at 16.
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investors. At the same time, the structure does not appear to hold out an all
purpose replacement for the still-potent combination of unlimited duration
equity capital and market liquidity.

